Although jurisprudential sources have stipulated specific conditions for accepting repentance, such as expressing regret, performing righteous deeds, rejecting human rights, fulfilling obligations, and other such matters, many rulings issued by various branches of the courts are in clear contradiction with the Imamiyyah jurisprudence's view of the conditions for accepting repentance. In this way, the judicial authority has paid attention to the issue of recognizing repentance without entering into the Sharia ritual of repentance and with a personal perspective. As a result, based on the personal perspective of the judicial authority, which is in conflict with the jurisprudential view of the category of recognizing repentance; first: Sometimes, merely expressing remorse, not recognizing it, has been a reason for avoiding punishment by the judicial authority and ultimately for the punishment to be dropped. Secondly: It leads to a dual approach in the way of recognizing repentance and as a result, the dispersion of the decisions issued by the judicial courts. Thirdly: The expansion of the criteria for recognizing repentance by abandoning the "religious criterion" and developing another "personal criterion" is the result of this conflicting approach. This descriptive-analytical article aims to briefly examine the jurisprudential sources of repentance and compliance with existing opinions issued by the courts; first: to examine the duty of the judicial authority in dealing with the defendant's expression of repentance. Second: to explain the dual and contradictory views on the recognition of repentance by citing judicial opinions